Connected by sea, disconnected by tuna? Challenges to regionalism in the Southwest Indian Ocean by CAMPLING, L et al.
1 
 
Connected by sea, disconnected by tuna? Challenges to regionalism in 1 
the Southwest Indian Ocean 2 
Andriamahefazafy, M.*, Kull, C.A.*, Campling, L.** 3 
*Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, 4 
Switzerland 5 
** School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, 6 
United Kingdom 7 
Corresponding author: Mialy Andriamahefazafy, Institute of Geography and 8 
Sustainability, Route de la Mouline, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, 9 
mialyzanah.andriamahefazafy@unil.ch  10 
 11 
Abstract 12 
Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles are at the center of industrial tuna extraction in the 13 
southwest Indian Ocean. Tuna, a migratory species, travel through the national waters of 14 
multiple countries as well as the high seas. This tuna fishery attracts distant water fleets 15 
from Spain, France, Japan, and Korea. This paper investigates how the southwest Indian 16 
Ocean tuna fishery intersects with regionalism, defined as both the construction of a 17 
regional identity and collaboration between countries. We show that while a discourse of 18 
regionalism between the three islands is prominent in initiatives such as the Indian Ocean 19 
Commission’s promotion of an ‘Indianoceanic identity’, the possibilities of regionalism 20 
cooperation face deep challenges in relation to the regional tuna industry. We argue that 21 
this is due to three factors. First, local perceptions, especially amongst those working in 22 
and on the tuna industry in the three islands, are in disconnection with an ‘Indianoceania’ 23 
vision. Second, the geopolitics between coastal states and distant water fishing nations 24 
create various entanglements including through fishing access revenue and foreign aid. 25 
Finally, the materiality of tuna and its migration patterns can at times create competition 26 
as countries seek to individually maximize benefits from the industry. While tuna is 27 
considered to be the region’s “blue gold”, we argue that the active reinforcement of 28 
regional identity and collaboration around this resource among the three islands is 29 
necessary to sustain local benefits into the future and ensure the development of a 30 
regional vision for the fishery.  31 
Key words: tuna, regional political ecology, fisheries, Indianoceania, regional 32 
cooperation, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles/. 33 
  34 
2 
 
1. Introduction 35 
The countries of the Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO) are involved in various forms of 36 
regional collaborations, including through the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). A 37 
stated objective of the IOC is to contribute to the building of an ‘Indianoceania’ 38 
identity, promoted as a “regional consciousness of belonging to a common space and a 39 
community of island destiny” (IOC, 2013 p. 94). To this end, the IOC, as the 40 
coordinating agency in the region, has established four strategic pillars – diplomacy, 41 
security, environment and identity building – around which countries can mutually 42 
contribute to the sustainable development of the region. 43 
Tuna resources are one of the shared assets of the ‘Indianoceania’1, producing 44 
around 10% of the global catch of commercial tuna species and considered one of the 45 
pillars of blue economy in the region (Doyle, 2018). The catch of yellowfin and 46 
skipjack was 540,000 tonnes in 2011, out of a global catch of 4.6 million tons 47 
(POSEIDON et al. 2014). Several species of tuna are present in the region, migrating 48 
between the different Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) of the SWIO countries and the 49 
high seas. These include the highly commercial species such as albacore, bigeye, 50 
skipjack and yellowfin, as well as coastal tuna such as bonitos and frigate tuna that are 51 
mainly caught by small-scale fishers and as bycatch in industrial fishing (POSEIDON et 52 
al., 2014; van der Elst and Everett, 2015). In the ‘Indeanoceania’ region and especially 53 
the three islands studied, tuna is an important source of trade, employment and foreign 54 
revenue. Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs), such as those of the European 55 
Union, Japan and Korea, play a major role in the SWIO region. Local tuna fishing, 56 
artisanal and semi-industrial, is also an important source of livelihoods and food 57 
security, but with catches that are less substantial in quantity (no more than 1,000 58 
Mt/year) than in other countries of the Indian Ocean such as Indonesia, Iran or Sri 59 
Lanka.2 However, in contrast to the Western Central Pacific region where tuna fisheries 60 
                                                
1 Other highly migratory species such as marlin, sailfish and swordfish are also an important 
component of fisheries management in the SWIO region, as referred to Article 64 of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on regional cooperation for conservation and optimum 
utilization of highly migratory species. However, these species are beyond the scope of this 
paper as in the three countries studied, their catches are much lower than those of tuna 
species – less than 10% in volume of catches within the EEZs (GoMu 2017a; SFA 2016; 
USTA 2017).  
2 The three countries studied also have an active sport fishing of tuna and billfishes but this 
fishery has been less studied and catches are believed to be insignificant in volume compared 
to catches from industrial purse seine and longline fleets.  
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have been a key driver for cooperation and a catalyst for a shared regional identity 61 
between the island countries (Hanich et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2014; Tarte, 2014), 62 
regional integration through tuna fisheries in the SWIO has been limited to a few 63 
fisheries projects, including attempts to establish the joint exploitation of the fisheries 64 
that did not go beyond trial phases (Association thonière 1990; Kasprzyk 1996). For 65 
example, the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organisation (WIOTO) was formed in 1991 66 
to counter the dominance of French and Spanish vessel owners over the WIO purse 67 
seine fishery (WIOTO 1991).3 It committed members to the regional harmonisation of 68 
fisheries policies; collaboration in members’ relations with distant water fishing nations 69 
to increase benefits from tuna resources; cooperation in fisheries surveillance and 70 
enforcement; and mutual access to the EEZs of WIOTO members (Marashi 1996; 71 
Michaud 1992). Several coastal state observers saw genuine benefits from the WIOTO 72 
(Campling 2012b), but it was a still-born institution. Only a handful of members 73 
remained by the mid-1990s (Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros and India), other parties to 74 
the organisation did not appear to take it seriously (Marashi 1996; WIOTC 1991), and 75 
France undermined the organization because of the explicit challenge to its tuna fleet 76 
(Campling 2012b). 77 
We argue in this paper that while sub-regional initiatives have helped the 78 
management of tuna fisheries, they have not contributed to the construction of a 79 
regional identity nor built a strong tuna-related collaboration. Due to their socio-80 
economic interests, their historical entanglements with DWFNs, and the current highly 81 
capitalized model of resource extraction, the countries of the region are struggling to 82 
create a unified voice and vision regarding tuna fisheries. The paper proceeds in stages: 83 
after a description of the methods we present the historical background of SWIO 84 
regionalism. We then discuss regional realities at three scales: locally through local 85 
fishers and tuna workers, then at national and regional scales. Finally, we investigate the 86 
role of the biophysical dynamics of tuna and the sea in shaping regional interactions. 87 
We conclude with some pathways towards the construction of the ‘Indianoceania’ 88 
regionalism through tuna fisheries.  89 
                                                
3 Signatories to the Convention establishing the WIOTO were Comoros, India, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.   
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2. Conceptual approach and methods  90 
By regionalism we refer to regional collaboration and cooperation between countries as 91 
well as the social construction of a regional identity through contextualized practices 92 
and narratives (Paasi, 2003; Tarte, 2014). To explore these dynamics, we draw on three 93 
sets of conceptual tools. First, we use insights from regional political ecology to unravel 94 
the complexity of regionalism in the SWIO and its manifestation through tuna fisheries. 95 
Political ecology has been mainly used as an approach to understand the role of political 96 
economy dynamics in environmental change and in turn how the latter conditions the 97 
realms of possibility of the former (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Peet et al., 2011; 98 
Robbins 2012). It can also involve adopting a post-structuralist outlook to analyze how 99 
discourses, identities, and policy narratives shape practices, including natural resource 100 
management (Agrawal, 2005; Forsyth, 2003; Gautier & Benjaminsen 2012). Regional 101 
Political Ecology (RPE), as a variation, has been interested in the idea of the region 102 
through a range of conceptual lenses. Originally established to integrate the local use of 103 
resources with broader structural processes and environmental conditions (Blaikie & 104 
Brookfield 1987), it has evolved to include discussions of how scalar dynamics 105 
politicize environmental problems at the regional level (Rangan & Kull 2009) and 106 
investigations of the discursive construction of regions and regional classifications 107 
(Galt, 2016; Simon, 2016). As Simon puts it “regions are performative and capable of 108 
doing work analytically, discursively and materially” (Simon, 2016, p. 199). Through 109 
examples drawn from tuna fisheries, we assess the SWIO as a region, using socio-110 
economic and environmental dimensions, and reveal connections across multiple scales. 111 
The use of regional political ecology is particular relevant to our account of regionalism 112 
through tuna fisheries as we pay particular attention to ‘natural’ resource use and 113 
politics in the making of a region.4 114 
Second, we attempt to place national decision-making regarding tuna in a more 115 
structural and historical context. We draw from insights and inputs regarding the 116 
political economy of tuna fisheries (Guillotreau & Le Roy 2001; Barclay and 117 
Cartwright 2007; Guillotreau et al. 2008; Havice and Campling 2010; Barnes and 118 
Mfodwo 2012; Campling 2012a; Campling and Havice 2018) and place tuna extraction 119 
in the broader context of natural resource industries where competitive interactions 120 
                                                
4 For a theorisation of the role of ‘natural’ resource industries in the global economy, see 
Baglioni and Campling (2017). 
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among actors can lead to unsustainable use of resources (Campling and Havice 2014; 121 
Longo and Clausen 2011; McWhinnie 2009; Baglioni and Campling 2017). We also 122 
explore the role of geopolitical and economic factors in influencing regional dynamics 123 
and the implications for cooperation among the three countries studied. In this process 124 
we aim to “comprehend the role of large geopolitical institutions and environmental 125 
change” (Bigger & Neimark, 2017, p. 20). In particular, we analyze the role of extra-126 
regional institutions such as the EU in shaping access to tuna and regional cooperation 127 
in the region (see also, Campling 2017).  128 
Third, we explore the role of ecological processes in shaping interactions 129 
between countries and the implications for regionalism in the SWIO. The materiality of 130 
non-human actors like tuna and the ocean “play an important political role in 131 
explanation” (Robbins, 2003, p. 643). This reflects a ‘material turn’ in political ecology 132 
(Bennett, 2010; Walker, 2005), which explores the active dynamics of non-humans and 133 
highlights the importance of biophysical ecology in socio-environmental research. 134 
Specifically, we discuss the role of tuna behavior and the physical geography of the sea 135 
in shaping interactions between countries involved in tuna fisheries. 136 
The results presented here are based on interviews, analysis of official reports, 137 
and observations in Madagascar, Seychelles, and Mauritius, as the principal 138 
independent tuna economies with active tuna ports and canneries (Comoros, Mayotte 139 
and Reunion have a less important role in the industrial tuna fishery). Semi-structured 140 
interviews were used to gather perspectives of stakeholders regarding regional 141 
collaboration in tuna fisheries at different levels. Stakeholders were identified by 142 
contacting the national fisheries agency as well as through spending 90 days in each 143 
country in well-known fishing villages and at the fishing ports.  The interviews took 144 
place in 2017 and the first quarter of 2018. Stakeholders included 35 small-scale fishers 145 
and industrial tuna boat crew, 18 government officials including staff of fisheries 146 
departments, monitoring and surveillance officers and statistic officers, 5 tuna 147 
processing company staff members and 4 NGO representatives involved in fisheries 148 
management (Table 1). We also collected information regarding regional projects linked 149 
to tuna fisheries through the analysis of reports from governmental archives and the 150 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), as well as online content found on the IOC 151 
and EU websites. We triangulated these sources and captured the interactions between 152 
countries of the SWIO and DWFNs through observations of two regional meetings: the 153 
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22nd session of the IOTC in May 2018 and the Eighth Session of the Southwest Indian 154 
Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC) in March 2017. 155 
 156 
Stakeholder interviewed Type of questions asked 
Small scale fishers Interaction with other fishers and knowledge about other 
fishers in the SWIO region 
Industrial tuna boat crew Knowledge about other crew and fishers working in the 
SWIO and location of fishing activity and landing ports 
Government officials Stakes regarding tuna fisheries and interests and 
obstacles to a regional collaboration in tuna fisheries 
Processing company staff Knowledge about and interaction with other cannery 
staff from the SWIO region 
NGO representatives Drivers and obstacles to regional collaboration in tuna 
fisheries in the SWIO 
Table 1: Types of stakeholders interviewed and content of interview questions 157 
3. SWIO regionalism and the case study countries 158 
The Indian Ocean is typified as “a space of trade” (Steinberg, 2001). It has long 159 
experienced exchanges of goods, people, animals and plants both before and after the 160 
colonial period (Beaujard, 2005; Boivin et al., 2013; Fuma, 2013). The Southwest part 161 
of the Indian Ocean is a discrete – and somewhat more marginal – region in these 162 
historical networks of exchange around the rim of the ocean (Beaujard, 2005; Moorthy, 163 
2010), with Seychelles and the Mascarene islands thought to be uninhabited before 164 
European colonialism. Commonalities between the countries of the region include their 165 
insular characteristic, their strong colonial history and the different waves of settlements 166 
creating from Africa, south and south-east Asia (Horeau 2013; IOC, 2013). As a result 167 
of these commonalities, it might be expected that “indianoceanic” space be cultivated 168 
among people in the region, linking shared history, identity, cultural heritage, and 169 
development aspirations among the islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, 170 
Mayotte, Reunion, Rodrigues, and Seychelles. However, such an identity is not yet 171 
strong. Indeed, “indianoceanic” identity is mainly promoted by the Indian Ocean 172 
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Commission (IOC) through various projects and collaborations between the member 173 
countries ranging from diplomacy to external trade and economic development, and 174 
from environmental protection to regional cultural interactions. Established in 1984, the 175 
IOC originally consisted of the five island countries:  Madagascar, Seychelles, 176 
Mauritius, Comoros, and France (for Reunion). A formative objective of the IOC is to 177 
improve relations and cooperation between these countries. Funded by diverse sources 178 
including the member countries and especially major donors such as the EU and the 179 
World Bank, the IOC has carried out several tuna-related projects, including 180 
SMARTFISH, “des thons et des hommes” and the Regional Fisheries Monitoring 181 
Program (PRSP, or Programme régional de surveillance des pêches). 182 
Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles are at the center of the SWIO tuna fishery – each 183 
having an active industrial fishing port and tuna canneries. However, they have 184 
distinctive socio-economic contexts and different levels and types of articulations with 185 
the tuna resources and the industry (Table 2). Socio-economically, Madagascar is much 186 
poorer than its two neighbors, with around 25 million people, it is ranked at 154 (out of 187 
188 countries) in the Human Development Index ranking, while Seychelles and 188 
Mauritius have much smaller populations and are classified as countries with high 189 
human development, ranked respectively at 63 and 64 (UNDP 2016). Tuna fisheries 190 
play a central role in Seychelles’ economy compared to in Mauritius, while the latter’s 191 
GDP is almost 10 times higher than Seychelles (Sellström 2015, UNDP 2016). 192 
Madagascar’s economy is focused on agricultural cash crops and has an under-193 
developed national tuna fishery mostly composed of small-scale coastal fishing and a 194 
handful of semi-industrial boats. In Mauritius, has a more developed small-scale tuna 195 
fishery and a semi-industrial fleet. Mauritius also hosts the main transshipment port for 196 
foreign longliners operating in regional waters. In Seychelles, tuna fisheries are at the 197 
center of the economy. In 2011, the tuna industry contributed to more than 90% of 198 
exports (Marsac et al. 2014). Seychelles has an important national semi-industrial tuna 199 
fleet and a small scale fishery that also catches tuna, without targeting it. Seychelles 200 
plays a key role in the tuna fisheries of the SWIO, having the most important port for 201 
the purse seine vessels to land and transship, largely by virtue of being in the middle of 202 
tuna fishing grounds (Campling 2012a). The three countries all host industrial fishing 203 
by European and Asian fleets. Data available within the three countries are more 204 
comprehensive regarding purse seine, which land at the three ports, compared to 205 
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longliners which either land their fish in Mauritius or transship at sea.   206 
 Madagascar Mauritius Seychelles 
Approximate yearly catch 
within the EEZ 
15,000 MT  4,500 MT 80,000 MT 
Landing for canneries 
from purse seiners  
13,295 MT in 2016  53,256 MT in 2014  65,500 MT in 2016  
Transshipment/ landing at 
port  
5,823 MT in 2016  ~140,000 MT/year  262,798 in 2016  
Employment generated 
from the industrial sector 
[direct and indirect] 
7,500 in 2017  7,207 in 2015  7,000 in 2009 
Table 2: Key articulations with tuna extraction in the three islands.  207 
Sources: For Madagascar: Breuil, C. & Grima, D. 2014; OEPA 2017; USTA 2017;  208 
For Mauritius: COFREPECHE et al. 2016; Gillet 2011; GoMU 2017a; World Bank 209 
2017, World Bank 2017, World Bank 2017 (Appendix 2);  210 
For Seychelles: Campling 2012b; Gillet 2011; IOTC 2017; IOTC 2018 211 
 212 
4. Regionalism among tuna fishers and laborers 213 
In this section we investigate the perceptions of local people working in tuna fisheries 214 
on the region. We unfold discursive representations of the region as seen by those 215 
working on tuna. We argue that the proposed idea of ‘Indianoceania’, strongly built on 216 
the shared French heritage and language , supplemented by shared elements of creole 217 
culture for the Mascarenes and Seychelles, as well as common history, overlooks the 218 
opaque connections between local people working in tuna fisheries. This creates a 219 
region where stakeholders involved in tuna are disassociated with regional identity. We 220 
illustrate this argument with two examples.  221 
4.1. Tuna workers and an ‘Indianoceania’ identity? 222 
In a press release in 2016 on regional monitoring, the IOC emphasized the importance 223 
of tuna fisheries for the region as a common natural capital (IOC, 2016). Yet, 224 
discussions with local stakeholders involved in the tuna fishery on regional identity 225 
shows a more nuanced picture.  226 
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Interviews with fishers in the three countries studied build a picture of an 227 
‘Indianoceania’ region with disconnected people when it comes to tuna fisheries. 228 
Amongst 35 fishers interviewed, only five had knowledge of interactions in tuna 229 
fisheries: two fishers in Madagascar knew there were other Malagasies working in the 230 
Seychelles cannery, one in Mauritius knew that some Seychellois were also fishing tuna 231 
in the waters of Mauritius, and two fishers in Seychelles had contacts with Malagasy 232 
and Mauritian fishers. Very few knew about the potential in the different countries of 233 
tangible collaboration in tuna fisheries. Crews of semi-industrial boats in Seychelles for 234 
example are mainly Sri Lankan. When asked about working with other fishers from the 235 
region, 20 fishers in Seychelles could only mention Sri-Lankans. While the latter have 236 
built skills in longline fishing over decades (Hewamanage, 2010; Pajot, 1978), regional 237 
initiatives have not succeeded in linking tuna fishers within the region who could 238 
benefit from each other’s strengths, such as tuna fishers from Madagascar, or local 239 
fishing vessels in the Seychelles, or fishes to use for bait from Mauritius.   240 
Involvement of local people in the tuna industry occurs more frequently through 241 
work at the canneries. For instance, Malagasy laborers work in Mauritius and 242 
Seychelles. One might assume that such working relations build regional identity 243 
through working on a shared resource. However, the reality depicts a common picture 244 
of work migration for higher wages without local integration (de Haas, 2010; Craig, 245 
2015). For instance, Malagasy tuna workers in Seychelles feel marginalized. a 246 
Malagasy worker based in Seychelles for three years stated “they do not really like us 247 
here, they think we are only poor and low level workers for the cannery” (Personal 248 
Communication (PC) 01, cannery worker). While migrant workers recognize the 249 
improved social and economic conditions they are experiencing in Seychelles compared 250 
to Madagascar, the tuna workers do not feel integrated nor part of an ‘Indianoceania’ 251 
community (PC 02 and 03, cannery workers in Seychelles). The geographical proximity 252 
of ‘Indianoceania’ countries has allowed the practice of work migration, yet everyday 253 
practices and experiences of the workers do not appear to have led to the development 254 
of a regional identity. 255 
These two illustrations show that at the local level, tuna fishers and cannery 256 
workers see themselves more as individuals than part of a regional community linked by 257 
the fishery. Despite the region being advertised as ‘islands, close and united’ (IOC, 258 
2013), local livelihoods are detached from regionalism. 259 
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4.2. Bringing regional artisanal fishers together  260 
To address the previous lack of connections between the Indianoceanic people, the IOC, 261 
under its SMARTFISH program, mainly funded by the EU, supported in 2015 the 262 
development of a federation of professional associations of small-scale fishers of the 263 
Indian Ocean (FPAOI for Fédération des pêcheurs artisans de l’océan Indien). By 2017, 264 
the FPAOI included 18 professional organizations and associations representing 265 
artisanal fishers in the five member countries (FPAOI, 2017). The aim of the federation, 266 
according to a press release, is “to allow an efficient and informed participation of 267 
fishers to decision-making processes regarding the management of fisheries in the 268 
Southwest Indian Ocean” (IOC, 2015a). While the activities of the Federation are aimed 269 
at fisheries in general, it is also involved in activities linked to tuna fisheries. The 270 
Federation has brought members together for workshops (for instance on fish handling), 271 
and for retreats to develop a regional management plan for coastal tuna fisheries (IOC, 272 
2018). It has also undertaken advocacy at the IOTC for better tuna management, such as 273 
reducing the use of fish aggregating devices or criticizing the historical catch approach 274 
of distant water fishing nations in discussions of allocations as impeding the 275 
management efforts of coastal states (FPAOI, 2017; Personal observation). When 276 
interviewed about involvement at IOTC, one member of the FPAOI declared “the 277 
presence of small-scale fishers at the IOTC has helped the adoption of more 278 
management measures since 2016, we have expressed the high stake that the fisheries 279 
represent for us for livelihood and food security” (PC 04, fisher member of FPAOI). 280 
These activities of the FPAOI effectively bring fisher representatives together and 281 
involves them in policy-making.  282 
 An important point here is that the principal source of funding for FPAOI 283 
activities to-date is the EU through the IOC; the ability of FPAOI members, the fishers, 284 
to undertake activities is dependent on this funding. This may be problematic as the EU 285 
is the same actor that fiercely negotiates within the IOTC to adopt measures that are less 286 
beneficial to the local fishers of the region (Hussain, 2018) or increase its fishing 287 
opportunities in countries’ EEZs at a questionable price (Standing, 2016). This indirect 288 
dependency on an actor with sometimes conflicting interests represents a paradox for 289 
the Federation’s viability in the longer term. 290 
Here we can see that the FPAOI represents an important opportunity in building 291 
the identity of a region of tuna fishers through connecting small-scale fishers and 292 
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building a regional voice in policy making. However, the current dependency of the 293 
Federation upon external funding could jeopardize its success if the it does not develop 294 
independent mechanisms to sustain itself in the future.    295 
5. Geopolitics, dependency, and regional cooperation   296 
A second factor that intervenes with regionalism in the SWIO is the geopolitical 297 
economy (Bigger and Neimark, 2017; Glassman, 2017) of tuna fisheries. Here we 298 
investigate larger-scale institutional and power-laden processes at work in the 299 
production of region-defining resources like tuna, recognizing that “geopolitics are 300 
always being expressed spatially and socio-spatial relations always being expressed in 301 
part through forms of geopolitical power” (Glassman, 2017, p.411). In the context of 302 
tuna fisheries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Havice and Campling have shown how 303 
the development of tuna fisheries over the past few decades has intertwined global 304 
market regimes, commodity demands, technological and organizational innovation, and 305 
the ecology of the resource, leading to dependency by coastal states on distant fishing 306 
powers but also building leverage for local claims to resource sovereignty (Havice and 307 
Campling 2010; Campling, 2012a; Campling & Havice, 2014; Havice & Campling, 308 
2017; Havice, 2018).  309 
 Drawing on these insights, we make the point that SWIO countries and 310 
especially the three countries studied have been entangled historically and economically 311 
with distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) which influences oscillations in their 312 
positions when it comes to negotiating about tuna fisheries. We provide three examples 313 
of problematic regional integration: catch allocation discussions, surveillance and 314 
monitoring, and bilateral fishing access agreements. 315 
5.1. Catch allocation dilemmas 316 
Negotiations over catch allocation were initiated within the IOTC in 2011 and continue 317 
to this day (IOTC, 2011; IOTC, 2018). The three countries studied and the DWFNs 318 
accessing tuna resources in SWIO waters are member parties of the IOTC and actively 319 
involved in this discussion. At the meeting we observed in 2018 there was a substantial 320 
divide between the members of the IOTC regarding catch allocations. On one side is a 321 
group of DWFNs, particularly Japan, Korea, China, France and Spain (the latter two 322 
represented by the EU), who dominate the industrial extraction of tuna in the Indian 323 
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Ocean. On the other side, there are the 21 coastal states of the Indian Ocean, including 324 
the three islands studied, known as the G16 group (named after Article XVI of the 325 
IOTC agreement, acknowledging the sovereign rights of coastal states over living 326 
resources in their EEZs) (IOTC, 1993). The two sides have put forward distinctive 327 
proposals. The DWFNs, led by the EU, propose to allocate 85% of the catch based on 328 
historical catch in the Indian Ocean (IOTC, 2018), which would give DWFNs effective 329 
rights over the vast majority of future catches. Whereas a proposal from the G16, led by 330 
Maldives, seeks to allocate catch based on more criteria: a baseline for all coastal states, 331 
historical catch, and supplementary allocations for catch on the high seas and for small 332 
island states and developing coastal states (IOTC, 2018).  333 
 Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles had three very different positions 334 
regarding the G16 proposal: Seychelles was a strong co-sponsor of the proposal; 335 
Madagascar and Mauritius were not co-sponsors. The delegation of Seychelles for 336 
example pressured the Commission to make progress on the allocation issue, whereas 337 
DWFNs wanted a more cautionary approach of looking in more detail at the proposals 338 
through simulations (IOTC, 2018; pers. obs.). The Seychelles position can be explained 339 
by the increasing development of its national tuna fisheries (Seychelles-flagged boats) 340 
as well as a long-standing active engagement in seeking to capture greater gains from 341 
the SWIO tuna industry (e.g. Campling 2012b). Mauritius used the IOTC fora to make 342 
sovereignty claims over the Chagos Archipelagos (administered by the UK as the 343 
British Indian Ocean Territory), repeatedly asking that the UK does not received any 344 
allocation due to its illegitimate presence in the Indian Ocean, despite the UK not 345 
having expressed support for any of the two proposals (IOTC, 2018; pers. obs.). 346 
Madagascar kept largely silent, only intervening to ask for a collaborative approach and 347 
recognition of the rights of the coastal states (Pers. obs.). When asked about this 348 
position, one delegate declared “we have to see how things unfold, we support the G16 349 
but this is a very sensitive issue for us” (PC 05, government official). 350 
 These interactions demonstrate an absence of ‘Indianoceania’ regional 351 
collaboration and cooperation. The three countries studied have distinctive priorities and 352 
are not acting as a harmonized region. In effect, coastal countries are using tuna 353 
discussions to defend territorial sovereignty, illustrating Havice’s (2018) ‘more than 354 
territorial’ way of reclaiming state power. Geopolitical struggles between the UK and 355 
Mauritius prevented the latter from joining the G16 position, instead prioritizing its 356 
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sovereignty claims. Seychelles shows itself as a geopolitical leader amongst the coastal 357 
countries and therefore carries a position in favor of the G16 proposal. Madagascar, 358 
more reliant on foreign aid for the development of its fisheries, adopted a more 359 
cautionary approach. 360 
5.2. Foreign aid dependency and regional competition 361 
A second example of how geopolitical and economic entanglements contribute to 362 
limited regional integration is the aid dependency of coastal countries on DWFNs. 363 
Valuable tuna fisheries are an important dimension for these entanglements. The 364 
European Union, Japan, and China are major donors of development aid and fisheries 365 
aid. The EU is for example engaged in a national development aid program amounting 366 
to €518m in Madagascar covering governance, infrastructure and rural development 367 
(European Union, 2016a). In 2017, Japan invested €370m  in the extension of the Port 368 
of Toamasina in Madagascar (Hanazaki, 2017). In Mauritius and Seychelles, where the 369 
level of economic development is higher, there are also contributions from those 370 
DWFNs. Under the 11th European Development Fund for example, there is a €9.9m 371 
program for Mauritius (European Union, 2016b) and a €2.2m program for Seychelles 372 
(European Union, 2014a). Aid contributions influence how coastal states interact with 373 
DWFNs and with each other, as seen in the Pacific Islands region for example (Tarte, 374 
1997).  375 
 Fishing access agreements play a key role in the making of foreign aid in the 376 
SWIO region. The EU is the most prominent example, where revenue from access 377 
agreements includes sectoral support dedicated to the improvement of fisheries and 378 
fisheries policy in the host countries.  In the three countries studied, this sectoral support 379 
has over the years contributed to the construction of core infrastructure such as fisheries 380 
agency buildings and ports. It has also served to fund different projects within fisheries 381 
departments including the registration of small-scale fishers in Madagascar, the 382 
improvement of port infrastructure used by small-scale fishers in Seychelles, and the 383 
improvement of patrolling capacity in Mauritius (European Union, 2014b; GoS 2011, 384 
2013; COFREPECHE et al., 2015). Such contributions, which date back to the 385 
beginning of SWIO industrial fisheries in the 1980s, have created a strong relation 386 
between the independent island countries involved in fishing access agreements with 387 
DWFNs. These interactions can constitute drivers of different positions taken by 388 
governments at regional tuna meetings such as the IOTC (PC 06, government official; 389 
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Tarte, 1997). This appears to be a contributing factor preventing countries like 390 
Madagascar and Mauritius from joining or strongly supporting the G16 proposal 391 
discussed above. 392 
 Another example of the role of broader political economy dynamics on the 393 
relationship between coastal states is how it fosters competition more than cooperation. 394 
The three countries studied all have landing ports, canneries and fishing grounds with 395 
different levels of productivity, as illustrated in Table 2 (Kaplan et al., 2014; 396 
POSEIDON et al., 2014). The three canneries were originally built in collaboration with 397 
foreign private companies. Mauritius saw its cannery built in the 1970s with funding 398 
from Japanese companies (Campling, 2012b, p. 434), Seychelles in 1987 in 399 
collaboration with French and Spanish companies (Campling, 2012a; Marsac et al. 400 
2014, p. 222), and Madagascar in 1990 with French companies (Gilbert & 401 
Rabenomanana, 1996). While those infrastructures all brought economic development 402 
to the countries, they were not built with a regional vision. Fishing operators land at the 403 
most economically efficient port, mainly Port Victoria, Seychelles and at as a last resort 404 
in Antsiranana, Madagascar. Industrial tuna fisheries in the SWIO have been driven by 405 
a continuous need to satisfy demands of commodity production and by capitalist logics 406 
of extraction (Campling, 2012a). This unequal dynamic of extraction is not uncommon 407 
in marine fisheries and especially in tuna fisheries where mainly foreign fishing fleets 408 
use the resources to maximize their profitability at the expense of host countries, 409 
themselves often constrained by the need for revenue, leading to unsustainable levels of 410 
catch (Campling and Havice 2014; Longo and Clark 2012, Schurman 1998). 411 
Governments seeking to sustain economic benefits from the fishery are favorable to 412 
access agreements and try to improve port infrastructure to encourage the landing of 413 
tuna in their country. Regional integration in tuna fisheries is thus challenged by the 414 
global economy of tuna production that puts coastal and island countries in competition 415 
among each other, undermining their capacity to harmonize their actions.  416 
5.3. Successful stories with grey areas  417 
The region does exhibit examples of successful regional collaboration. These are the 418 
regional monitoring program and the bilateral fishing access agreements between 419 
Mauritius and Seychelles. Their success, however, is tainted by geopolitical 420 
interventions, notably by the influential role played by DWFNs in these initiatives. 421 
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 The most successful example of regional integration is the Regional Fisheries 422 
Monitoring Program or PRSP (“Programme Regional de Surveillance des Pêches”), an 423 
intergovernmental project led by the IOC. The program started in 2007, mainly funded 424 
by the EU. It encompasses a system of satellite data sharing as well as joint and 425 
collaborative surveillance in the EEZs of IOC members. Each member sends patrolling 426 
agents from their respective countries as well as patrol vessels that are jointly used for 427 
surveillance in the SWIO region (IOC, 2015b). In the past ten years, the program has 428 
been considered as having drastically diminished illegal fishing in the region through 429 
“45 regional patrols, 930 hours of air surveillance and more than 70 offences recorded” 430 
(IOC, 2016). When asked about the program, officials in the three countries 431 
acknowledged the improvement that the program has brought to the fight against illegal, 432 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the waters of the IOC countries. In 2016, 433 
the EU committed another €1.5 million to support the program (IOC, 2016) and in 434 
2017, a new declaration was made to confirm the interest of countries in pursuing the 435 
program and the fight against IUU (IOC, 2017). The PRSP is therefore a good 436 
illustration where common interests bring countries together. The program could thus 437 
be an important catalyst for regional identity. As expressed by an interviewee in 438 
Madagascar, “protection of the resources and fight against IUU bring cohesion in the 439 
region” (PC 07, patrolling inspector). 440 
 A point worth exploring is the involvement of the EU in the funding of the 441 
program and by extension its funding of IOC activities. The contribution of the EU 442 
serves its own interests in that the French and Spanish boats dominate the regional purse 443 
seine fishery (Campling 2012a) and this puts into question the argument that this is an 444 
example of regional interests coalescing. With its flagged vessels operating in the 445 
waters of IOC members, funding the PRSP largely benefits EU fishing operators, whose 446 
catches are protected from other non-EU entities fishing illegally in the region. One 447 
interviewee expressed that “countries have to be aware that the EU also gives us money 448 
to protect its own interest, they benefit from their own investment in the region” (PC 08, 449 
government official). 450 
 Another successful collaboration within the SWIO region is the reciprocal 451 
fishing access agreements between Mauritius and the Seychelles since the 1990s. These 452 
agreements allow reciprocity in terms of fishing grounds: specifically licensed boats 453 
from each country have access to both EEZs. For the agreement signed in 2017 for two 454 
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years, 25 fishing boats (purse seiners/longliners) from both countries were to operate in 455 
the EEZs of the two countries at a fee of $110,000/$30,000 per boat per year to be paid 456 
by Mauritius vessels and $30,000/$24,000 per boat per year to be paid by Seychelles 457 
vessels (Seychelles Nation, 2017). Considering that neither of the two countries have 458 
national industrial purse seiners and that they both have a limited number of national 459 
longliners (GoS, 2016; GoMU, 2017b; pers. obs.), it can be concluded that the 460 
agreement covers boats that are foreign-owned but flagged in one or the other country. 461 
Foreign operators from Spain, France and Taiwan flag their boats from Mauritius or 462 
Seychelles against a flagging fee. In the Seychelles for example, 13 purse seiners and 45 463 
longliners used the Seychelles flag in 2015 (GoS 2016). Flagging can be seen as 464 
beneficial for both parties: it adds to the national fleet of the coastal countries, provides 465 
a flagging revenue, and effectively allows foreign fishing companies to use more 466 
vessels than those authorized under a bilateral agreement. Such strategies are however 467 
questionable. They increase fishing capacity in the region at a time where the IOTC is 468 
trying to implement measures to rebuild the tuna stock (IOTC, 2017). The fishing 469 
activities of those vessels also present other challenges, such as the difficulty of obtain 470 
accurate statistics of catch and effort, or the fact that they may fall under dubious tax 471 
regulations and ambiguous labor standards (Campling & Colás 2017). 472 
 This section has shown that cooperation regarding tuna fisheries at the regional 473 
level is paved with socio-economic and geopolitical obstacles. Existing successes 474 
remain dependent on external actors that ultimately benefit from both the collaboration 475 
and lack of regional agreement. 476 
6. The role of tuna and the sea 477 
Our third entry point to discussing challenges to regionalism in the SWIO is the role of 478 
biophysical and geographical aspects of tuna resources and the sea in the making of the 479 
region. We look at ways how relationships, interactions and associations between 480 
entities – humans and non-humans – stabilize or disrupt a particular socio-political 481 
order (Haraway, 2003; Robbins, 2012; Whatmore, 2002). Campling (2012a), for 482 
example, showed that the diversity of tuna species, their biological characteristics but 483 
also their migration patterns influence conditions of production, requiring fishing 484 
operators to use technology and specific fishing methods.  485 
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 There are various species of tuna, from the five main commercial species 486 
including albacore, bigeye, bluefin, skipjack, and yellowfin, to coastal species such as 487 
bullet tuna, frigate tuna and kawakawa. They are present at different depths, distances 488 
from the coast and at different times of the year (Dagorn, 1994; Nikolic & Bourjea, 489 
2013; Reygondeau et al. 2012). Tuna in the SWIO move between the countries’ EEZs 490 
as well as across invisible lines dividing the EEZs and the high seas. Skipjack, for 491 
example, are highly mobile and undertake long distance movements. They can be found 492 
in the Mozambique channel and the waters of Seychelles between March and June then 493 
move towards the northwest Indian Ocean until around November (Campling 2012a; 494 
Fonteneau 2014). Other species can be found all year long in different countries’ waters 495 
or undertaking a circular journey. Yellowfin and bigeye tuna for example are found in 496 
the waters of Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles between April and December and 497 
further offshore between November and March. Coastal tuna are mostly present all year 498 
in the coastal waters of the countries (Kaplan et al. 2014, Sabarros et al. 2017, analysis 499 
of the authors). Under the Law of the Sea, Article 62, tuna fall under the sovereign 500 
rights of states while in their EEZs and foreign fleets must negotiate fishing access 501 
agreements, while Article 64 requires regional cooperation. In the West and Central 502 
Pacific Ocean, purse seine access arrangements operate at a sub-regional scale, with 503 
Pacific island countries (PICs) cooperating effectively as a group in their Vessel Day 504 
Scheme (VDS) negotiations with DWFNs (Havice 2013; Fry & Tarte, 2015). The 505 
underpinning advantage that PICs enjoy is that tuna populations targeted in the purse 506 
seine fishery – skipjack and juvenile yellowfin – tend to migrate for the majority of their 507 
lives through the interlocking EEZs of these countries. With the result that access to the 508 
fish at most points requires cooperation with at least one PIC and thus, to survive 509 
commercially, DWFNs must cooperate with the VDS. The limits of this approach 510 
appear to be found in the PIC attempt to apply a VDS to the longline fishery, where 511 
target species – bigeye and adult yellowfin – tend to exist for considerable periods 512 
outside of EEZs, with the effect that some DWFNs have so-far been able to avoid 513 
participation and concentrate effort in the high seas (Campling et al. 2017).   514 
In the SWIO, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles each have individual access 515 
agreements with the EU and/or Asian fishing associations, a situation that has not 516 
changed since the 1980s (Gagern & van den Bergh, 2013; Le Manach et al., 2013). This 517 
difficulty of applying the approach used by PICs is that the catch of industrial fishing 518 
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and especially purse seiners in the Indian Ocean is mostly in the high seas. Individual 519 
negotiations put each country in the position of negotiating with more powerful and 520 
organized entities with access to better information (Standing, 2016). Furthermore, it 521 
incentivizes countries to get the most benefit out of the tuna resource while it is in their 522 
waters. One interviewee when asked about fishing access agreements made the 523 
comment that “tuna moves, if they are not caught in our waters, it will be caught in the 524 
waters of the other islands around so it is a loss of revenue for the country to not have 525 
those agreements” (PC 09, government official). Without working actively on a regional 526 
access strategy, the movement of tuna populations can disrupt the regionalism that 527 
countries are working towards and isolates countries in the negotiation sphere. 528 
 In addition to the movement of tuna, the geography of the sea itself plays an 529 
important role. The productivity of the Indian Ocean is not homogenous and depends on 530 
factors such as the summer monsoon winds, the periodic upwelling and the productivity 531 
of local ecosystems (Kaplan et al., 2014; POSEIDON et al. 2014). Seychelles is blessed 532 
with the most productive waters, especially for the commercial tuna species. Catches in 533 
Madagascar’s EEZ rely essentially on the Mozambique Channel’s productivity for 534 
species like yellowfin and skipjack and on the Southern Ocean for albacore, bigeye and 535 
bluefin tuna, while Mauritius’s waters are the least productive of the region (Fonteneau, 536 
2010; Gillet, 2011). This variability in productivity implies that countries have different 537 
levels of leverage in their access agreements negotiations, again undermining a common 538 
approach to the access. Such differentiation ultimately mitigates against attempt at 539 
regionalizing the tuna fishery or its governance.   540 
 It is worth elaborating on the jurisdictional reach of the island nations and its 541 
relationship to control over resource access. The three case study countries all border 542 
the high seas which means that tuna comes in and out of EEZs and is followed into the 543 
high seas by industrial vessels. More than 50% of the catches by Seychelles’ flagged 544 
vessels (purse seiners and longliners) are made in the high seas (GoS, 2016). Similarly, 545 
in 2014, 51% of the catches from EU purse seiners took place in the high seas 546 
(POESEIDON et al.  2014, p. 84). Because the SWIO region is adjacent to large high 547 
sea areas (in contrast to the PICs and the purse seine tuna species), countries do not 548 
have control over the extraction of tuna resources beyond their EEZs. A 2018 study 549 
using satellite data from fishing vessels showed that a high number of suspicious 550 
transshipment activities were taking place at the border of EEZs (Miller et al., 2018). In 551 
19 
 
the current lack of control over fishing in the high seas, regional initiatives towards 552 
management and access to the resources by SWIO countries will have limited success 553 
without institutionally complex and politically risky innovations, that may well require 554 
brinkmanship and the short-term loss of tuna-related revenues. Further, while the IOTC 555 
has management authority over tuna fishing activities in the high seas, the adoption of 556 
management measures within the IOTC is dependent on the political will of its 557 
members who often have a challenging time to reach consensus on effective resolutions. 558 
 We have seen that tuna populations and the sea are important dimensions that 559 
influence extractive strategies and limit the scope of political will. While tuna could be 560 
a unifying resource requiring a regional vision, the current geopolitics and economics of 561 
the fishery in the region make the materiality of the resources a barrier to collaboration. 562 
Moreover, as a highly migratory resource, the state of the resources in national waters 563 
will ultimately be affected by fishing activities in the high seas, which fall under the 564 
management remit of the IOTC but which depends on the political will of IOTC 565 
members for the implementation of measures.  566 
7. Conclusion  567 
The ‘Indianoceania’ vision clearly has some way to go before it takes hold within tuna 568 
fisheries. Efforts have been made but those have limitations that need to be addressed. 569 
A regional political ecology approach has enlightened our understanding on three 570 
fronts.  First, it showed that in tuna fisheries, a regional identity is largely absent at the 571 
local level despite regional work migration and policy-related collaborations. Second, it 572 
highlighted the operation of political-economic dependencies in geopolitical relations 573 
and national decision-making regarding tuna management. Finally, it pointed to the role 574 
of tuna populations and the socio-spatial Indian Ocean as crucial influences in access 575 
struggles. In an attempt to contribute to transformative political research, the following 576 
points are provided as pathways for the SWIO region to advance its regional identity 577 
and integration in tuna fisheries.  578 
 A first action is an improved transparency on the role of foreign aid in tuna 579 
access. As DWFNs and coastal countries are entangled in relations that include foreign 580 
aid, trade and market access, and geopolitics, the lack of explicit mention of access to 581 
resources, and tuna in particular, in foreign aid policy puts coastal states in an 582 
intrinsically weak position when they are negotiating access to resources. It also needs 583 
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to be recognized that DWFNs are non-homogenous entities. The EU is a good 584 
illustration with its visible contradictions in tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean. While its 585 
‘foreign aid’ arm is funding key projects to improve regional identity, collaboration and 586 
capacity building, its ‘commercial’ arm undermines this potential either at the IOTC or 587 
in fishing access negotiations. This demands caution from countries of the SWIO and 588 
the IOC when receiving funding for regional projects and reflection on the real interests 589 
of donors involved in tuna fisheries. As for the East Asian interventions in the region, 590 
the limited knowledge on the subject needs to be addressed. Very little is known on 591 
negotiations of access to tuna by East Asian DWFNs in the region and even less on the 592 
link between East Asian foreign aid and access to tuna in the countries studied. 593 
Increased transparency on this issue is a necessary but not sufficient step to benefit the 594 
region and improve the current leverage that SWIO island countries are seeking to 595 
build. 596 
 Second, we can say from our findings that the current situation will not really 597 
contribute to regional identity, beyond a few EU funded projects. Programs aiming to 598 
foster regionalism need to recognize that countries of the SWIO have as many 599 
differences as they do commonalities. Resource extraction in itself, especially within a 600 
capitalist logic, is a deeply challenging forum for fostering collaboration between 601 
actors.  An ‘Indianoceania’ vision and ultimately a regional tuna fishery is only possible 602 
if the interests of all parties are considered and individual socio-economic contexts are 603 
taken into consideration, including antagonisms. This difficult endeavor requires a 604 
differentiated approach looking at the needs of each country that could be fulfilled by 605 
collaboration with the others. Fishers could work together at the level of tuna fisheries, 606 
by sourcing bait from each other and/or exchanging skills and knowledge. An improved 607 
regional approach with a coordinated management across EEZs and building a more 608 
shared identity might be useful to break the current relations of dependency on DWFNs. 609 
Addressing issues in the high seas remains an important component. Ongoing 610 
international negotiations for a new international treaty for the high seas could represent 611 
a venue to provide some answers to this issue (Gjerde et al. 2018; ICTSD 2018). 612 
 Finally, it is necessary to decolonize interactions between coastal countries and 613 
DWFNs. The historical and colonial past of coastal countries including the three 614 
countries studied requires a change of paradigm from DWFNs, especially those of the 615 
EU. The EU’s speaks of ‘sustainable partnerships’ in setting up access agreements; but 616 
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this rhetoric should also be applied in negotiation practices – especially at the IOTC 617 
such as in its proposal for catch allocation. DWFNs have long claimed to have 618 
supported the capacity and development of coastal countries, but they need to better 619 
recognize that coastal countries now want greater endorsement of their sovereign rights 620 
over fisheries resources. Keeping as a core principle that highly migratory fisheries 621 
require cooperation for their sustainable conservation and utilization, it is only through 622 
equity and an agreement over what is ‘sustainability’ that parties will move forward and 623 
so might the ‘Indianoceania’ region. 624 
 625 
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